"Legal Institutions, Sectoral Heterogeneity, and Economic Development," by Castro, Rui et al.
Legal Institutions, Sectoral Heterogeneity, and
Economic Development∗
Rui Castro† Gian Luca Clementi‡ Glenn MacDonald§
December 10, 2005
Abstract
A large body of evidence suggests that poor countries tend to invest less (have
lower PPP–adjusted investment rates) and to face higher relative prices of in-
vestment goods. It has been suggested that this happens either because these
countries have lower TFP in the investment–good producing sectors, or because
they are subject to greater investment distortions. What is still to be understood,
however, is what are the causes of these shortcomings. In this paper we address
this question by providing a micro–foundation for the cross–country dispersion
in investment distortions. Our analysis rests on two premises: 1) countries differ
with respect to the rights enjoyed by outside investors (such as bondholders and
minority shareholders) and 2) firms producing capital goods face a higher level
of idiosyncratic risk than their counterparts producing consumption goods. In a
model of capital accumulation where the protection of investors’ rights is incom-
plete, this difference in risk induces a wedge between the returns on investment
in the two sectors. The wedge is bigger, the lower the investor protection. In
turn, this implies that countries endowed with weaker institutions are poorer,
face higher relative prices of investment goods, and invest a lower fraction of
their income. Our analysis also suggests that the mechanism we study may be
quantitatively important.
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1 Introduction
This paper is about understanding why per–capita income co–varies positively with
the PPP–adjusted investment rate and negatively with the the relative price of capital
goods. Our main conclusion is that cross–country differences in the quality of legal
institutions can account for a large fraction of the observed variation in prices and
investment rates.
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Figure 1: Investment Rates and Income Levels.
Heston and Summers (1988, 1996) first emphasized that the behavior of invest-
ment rates in the cross–section of countries depends on the prices used to compute
them. When capital goods are valued using international prices, investment rates
covary positively with income. However, when domestic prices are used, this pos-
itive association disappears: investment rates do not seem to covary with income.
These features of the data are documented in Figure 1, which was constructed using
data from Heston, Summers, and Aten’s (2002) Penn World Table, version 6.1. A
third fact, also reported by De Long and Summers (1991), Easterly (1993), and Jones
(1994), and documented in Figure 2, is that the relative price of investment goods with
respect to consumption goods is negatively correlated with income.1 These observa-
tions suggest that rich and poor countries devote similar fractions of their incomes
to investment expenditures, but the former obtain a higher yield in terms of capital
goods.
The economic development literature has produced two closely related rational-
izations for the evidence we have just described. Hsieh and Klenow (2003) argue that
1The series of relative prices was constructed using the price indexes for consumption and invest-
ment goods reported in the Penn World Table 6.1. The methodology followed in constructing these
indexes is outlined in Heston and Summers (1991) and in the technical documentation available at
http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/
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Figure 2: Relative price of Investment Goods and Income Levels.
poor countries may have lower investment rates simply because they are relatively
more efficient in the production of consumption goods. This would make investment
goods relatively more expensive, thereby lowering PPP investment rates. According
to Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (1996) and Restuccia and Urrutia (2001), it is the
variation in a generic form of investment distortion (wedge) that accounts for the evi-
dence. Both of these mechanisms are quite successful, in the sense that cross–country
differences in relative sectoral TFP or in investment wedges, when calibrated to match
the variation in prices in a neoclassical growth model, also generate a sizeable vari-
ation in investment rates. The next challenge is to understand the origin of either
form of cross–country heterogeneity (in relative TFP or in wedges). This is crucial,
if we entertain any ambition to suggest policies that may help poor countries develop
at a faster pace. In this paper, we provide a micro–foundation for the variation in
distortions and we evaluate its economic significance.
In our model, countries employ the same technologies. They differ, however, in
the extent to which the commercial law and its enforcement protect outside investors,
such as bondholders and minority shareholders, from expropriation by company in-
siders. Several recent papers, among which La Porta, Lopez-de Silanes, Shleifer, and
Vishny (1998), provide evidence in support of the hypothesis that investor protection
differs greatly across countries. The other crucial assumption is that firms producing
investment goods face higher baseline idiosyncratic risk than firms producing con-
sumption goods. In Section 2 we show that data drawn from COMPUSTAT Files for
the United States provide strong support for this hypothesis. Even after controlling
for a set of observable characteristics and for unobserved heterogeneity, companies
producing capital goods display a much higher volatility of sales growth. To our
knowledge, this is a novel result.
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Ours is a fairly standard two–sector overlapping generation model of capital ac-
cumulation. The two sectors produce investment goods and consumption goods, re-
spectively. Each individual is born endowed with entrepreneurial talent and decides
whether to allocate it to the production of investment or consumption goods. Regard-
less of his choice, he will have access to a technology displaying decreasing returns to
capital. The output outcome is stochastic, i.i.d. across technologies, and known only
to the technology’s owner. The only difference across sectors is that cash flows are
more volatile in the case of firms producing investment goods. Young individuals, who
we refer to as entrepreneurs, borrow capital from the old through financial interme-
diaries. The interaction between entrepreneurs and intermediaries takes the familiar
form of an optimal contracting problem under asymmetric information. The optimal
contract trades off risk–sharing and incentive provision. We model institutions by
assuming that entrepreneurs who misreport their outcomes and hide resources face
a deadweight loss. The magnitude of this loss reflects the effectiveness of all institu-
tional features that protect outside investors from expropriation by company insiders.
The larger the loss, the better the investor protection (the quality of institutions).
The optimal contract dictates that in either sector risk–sharing is increasing in the
level of investor protection and decreasing in the volatility of cash flows. Given our
assumption on the cross–sectoral variation in volatility, this implies a wedge between
the returns to investment in the consumption and in the investment good sector.
The size of this wedge is larger, the poorer the investor protection. In turn, this
implies that the relative price of capital goods is decreasing in the level of investor
protection. National income and the investment rate are also shown to be increasing
in the quality of the legal system. This happens because the wedge between the rates
of return on investment in the two sectors induces an allocative inefficiency, whose
magnitude depends negatively on the level of investor protection.
Our main conclusion is that differences in the quality of the legal system can
generate a correlation pattern between income level, the relative price of capital goods,
and the investment rate, which is qualitatively in line with the data. Our analysis also
hints that the mechanism we focus upon may be quantitatively important. A version
of our model, parameterized in order to be consistent with the observed dispersion in
relative investment prices, accounts for about one half of the standard deviation in
investment rates implied by the 1996 Penn World Table.
We see our paper as contributing to the research program in economic develop-
ment. The development literature started out by assuming that investment rates are
exogenous (see Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992)). Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan
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(1996) and Restuccia and Urrutia (2001) went further, arguing that the cross-country
variation in both investment rates and relative prices may be the result of distortions
in investment activity. The next step is to understand the nature of such distortions.
Hsieh and Klenow (2003) conclude that taxes or tariffs on investment goods are not
likely to be the answer, as they generate the counterfactual implication that invest-
ment goods’ absolute prices correlate negatively with income per worker.2 In this
paper, we assess whether the heterogeneity in distortions can be due to the combined
effect of cross-country differences in legal institutions and cross-sectoral differences in
idiosyncratic risk.
Our paper is closely related to recent contributions by Caselli and Gennaioli
(2003), Restuccia and Rogerson (2003), Castro, Clementi, and MacDonald (2004),
Restuccia (2004), Erosa and Hidalgo-Cabrillana (2004), Burstein and Monge-Naranjo
(2005), and Guner, Ventura, and Yi (2005). In common with these authors, we in-
vestigate the implications of allocative inefficiencies for economic development. Our
paper is closest to Castro, Clementi, and MacDonald (2004) and Erosa and Hidalgo-
Cabrillana’s (2004). As is the case here, in these papers the allocative inefficiency is
the result of information asymmetries in financial markets, and its magnitude depends
on the quality of institutions designed to protect investors. Finally, our paper is also
part of a recent literature that models investor protection in general equilibrium.3
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we provide
evidence in support of our assumption on the cross–sectoral variation of cash flow
volatility. We introduce the model in Section 3. In Section 4 we define and characterize
the competitive equilibrium allocation. In particular, we derive the relation between
investor protection and the relative price. In Section 5 we generalize the model in
order to render it better suited for quantitative analysis, and we propose a calibration
procedure. Section 6 is dedicated to comparative statics exercises. We show that,
according to our model, countries with weaker institutions have lower income and
lower investment rate. In Section 7 we allow for trade and for international capital
flows. In Section 8 we assess whether our model can account for the variation in
investment rates that emerges from the data. Finally, in Section 9 we discuss a few
extensions of our setup. We argue that the mechanism at the core of our theory can
2According to Hsieh and Klenow (2003), the cross–country correlation between per–capita income
and relative price of investment only reflects the variation in the absolute prices of consumption goods,
which tend to be lower in poor countries. Eaton and Kortum (2001) make the same observation.
3Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2002) study the effect of investor protection on the size of the equity
market and the number of public firms. Fabbri (2004) extends this analysis to consider the impact
of the quality of legal institutions on firm size and aggregate activity. Albuquerque and Wang (2004)
look at the asset pricing implications.
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have farther reaching implications than the ones we emphasized in this paper. Section
10 concludes.
2 Evidence on Firm–Level Volatility
In this section we provide evidence in support of our premise that firms in the invest-
ment good sector face higher baseline idiosyncratic risk than firms in the consumption
good sector. For reasons that will become clearer in Section 3, we are interested in
assessing the fraction of risk that is not accounted for by factors that would be known
to a firm’s financier. Among these factors, some are also observable to the econo-
metrician: size, age, and the sensitivity to aggregate fluctuations; others, such as
firm specific characteristics, are not. Our objective is to test whether in the case
of firms producing investment goods the conditional standard deviation of sales is
systematically higher than in the case of firms producing consumption goods.
Our dataset is an unbalanced panel of 7,648 firms, distributed in 60 3–digit NAICS
sectors. It consists of a total of 76,609 firm–year observations, drawn from Standard
& Poor’s COMPUSTAT North–America Industrial Annual Database from 1950 to
2003.4 We classify industries as consumption or investment good producing, based
on the final destination of their output. The Bureau of Economic Analysis’ Bench-
mark Input–Output tables provide information on the contribution of each industry
to consumption and investment final demand uses. We classify an industry as a con-
sumption good sector, say, if the ultimate destination of a sufficiently large share of
its output is final consumption. We use an analogous rule to assign industries to the
investment good category, and we discard sectors with very similar contributions to
either final use.5
Our measure of sales is Compustat item # 12, net sales. We first compute the
portion of sales growth variation that is not accounted for by factors, either known or
unknown to the econometrician, that are strongly associated with firm growth. We
accomplish this task by estimating the following equation:
∆ ln(sales)ijt = αi + δj∆ ln(GDP )t + β1j ln(size)ijt + β2j ln(age)ijt + εijt. (1)
The dependent variable is the growth rate of real sales (net sales over the GDP
deflator) for firm i in sector j, between years t and t + 1. The dummy variable
4Our sample selection procedure is detailed in Appendix A.
5The estimates reported in Table 3 in Appendix A indicate that consumption sectors that ac-
cording to common wisdom are more likely to produce durables behave much like investment good
sectors. Unfortunately, the I–O tables do not break down consumption expenditures into durables
and non–durables.
5
αi is a firm–specific fixed effect that accounts for unobserved heterogeneity across
firms, i.e. for the eventuality that firms have permanently different growth rates
for reasons that are unknown to us. Real GDP growth is introduced to control
for the variability in sales induced by business cycle fluctuations. Its coefficient is
sector–specific because industries differ in their sensitivity to such fluctuations. In
particular, since investment expenditures are well–known to be much more volatile
than consumption expenditures at the business cycle frequency,6 we expect δj to be
larger for sectors producing capital goods. Finally, size and age are included because
the empirical Industrial Organization literature has shown that firm growth declines
systematically with both of these variables.7 Size is Compustat item # 29, employees,
whereas age is the time since a firm first appeared in the sample.8,9
The OLS estimates are reported in Table 4 in Appendix A. Overall, these results
are consistent with the well known findings that firm growth is decreasing in both age
and size, and that the sales of investment good firms are more sensitive to aggregate
fluctuations than their consumption good counterparts’.
The objects of our interest, however, are the residuals εˆijt. The idea is to use
them to test for systematic differences in conditional volatility across sectors. The
null hypothesis is that var(εijt) is the same for firms belonging to consumption and
investment good sectors. The Breusch–Pagan test rejects it categorically at the con-
ventional significance level.10
Next, we would like to understand whether the test’s result is driven by a small
number of large and very volatile investment good sectors, or whether it is the conse-
quence of a more general tendency. To this end, we estimate the following equation:11
ln εˆ2ijt = θj + uijt. (2)
Letting θˆj denote the point estimate of the dummy coefficient θj,
√
exp(θˆj) is our esti-
mate of the conditional standard deviation of sales for firms in sector j. The estimates
6See for example Kydland and Prescott (1990).
7See Evans (1987) and Hall (1987).
8The number of employees is the most common measure of firm size in the empirical IO literature.
Its main advantage is that it is relatively immune to measurement problems.
9In principle, we would like to include among our regressors the growth rates of input utilization.
That exercise, essentially a production function estimation, would yield estimates of firm–level TFP.
We refrained from doing so because very often the book value of physical assets reported by Compustat
ends up being very different from their replacement value. The Longitudinal Research Database,
maintained by the Bureau of Census, has better data on capital, but covers only manufacturing firms
and is therefore not suited for our analysis.
10We base this test on a regression similar to (2). The Breusch–Pagan test statistic is equal to
1164.46, with a p–value lower than 0.0001.
11This formulation results from the assumption of a particular functional form for the sectoral
variance, σ2j = σ
2 exp(θj). The reader may realize that this is a special case of the multiplicative
heteroscedasticity model analyzed by Harvey (1976).
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Figure 3: Volatility of sales growth per 3-digit industry.
for all sectors are reported in Table 4 and graphed in Figure 3, sorted in ascending
order. The results are striking: all investment good sectors rank among the most
volatile in the economy. This is the case for Machinery Manufacturing (NAICS code
333) and Computer and Electronic Product Manufacturing (334), as well as for Con-
struction (233 and 234). Conversely, firms in Food Manufacturing (311) and Apparel
Manufacturing (315), two of the largest industries in terms of value added in most
economies, appear to be among the least volatile. Interestingly, the two consump-
tion good sectors that rank first and second are Owners and Lessors of Nonfinancial
Assets (533) and Oil and Gas Extraction (211). The former includes firms primarily
engaged in owning or leasing franchises, patents, and copyrights that they in turn
license others to use. Many of these firms are research companies that develop inno-
vations and then license them out to manufacturers. While our classification system
qualifies these two sectors as consumption good producing, we are not accustomed to
think of them as such. Their output consists exclusively of intermediate goods, the
majority of which are purchased by sectors that sell to final consumers. In spite of
this observation, consistency requires us to include them among consumption good
sectors.
We have conducted a series of robustness checks, the details of which are reported
in Appendix A. Our results do not change in any appreciable way when we change
the sample selection procedure or the regression equation specification. Therefore we
interpret these findings as providing strong support for the claim that firms producing
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investment goods face a higher idiosyncratic risk than firms producing consumption
goods.
In the remainder of this section we briefly address three questions: (i) Is selection
likely to bias our estimates? (ii) Would data gathered in other countries confirm
what we found in the case of the US? (iii) What causes the cross–sectoral variation
in conditional sales growth volatility?
It is well known that Compustat is not a representative sample of the population
of firms in the US, as it only includes companies whose stock is traded in an orga-
nized exchange. The question is whether this selection biases our results. Firms in
Compustat tend to be larger and older than their peers not included in the sample,
and therefore are less volatile. As noted above, we try to address this issue by con-
trolling for age and size. However, there may be other, unknown factors, that cause
firms’ sales growth volatility to be systematically higher or lower than the average US
firm’s. As long as these factors have the same impact on consumption and investment
good producing firms, the ranking of volatilities will not be influenced by the selec-
tion procedure. We will still be able to conclude that idiosyncratic risk is greater in
investment–good producing sectors. As it will become clear in Section 3, this is what
we need for most of our analysis to go through. The only results that depend on the
magnitude of the volatility estimates are those obtained by the quantitative exercise
conducted in Section 8.
In developing our theory, we will maintain that the cross–sectoral heterogeneity
in volatility that we documented for the United States applies to all other countries
as well. Unfortunately, lack of detailed firm–level data for most countries prevents
us from testing this claim. It is not clear, however, that even if firm–level data were
available for low–investor protection countries, we would want to use it. According to
Eaton and Kortum (2001), and consistently with our theory, relatively risky sectors do
not arise at all in countries with weak institutions.12 This selection would undoubtedly
bias downward the volatility estimates for such countries’ investment good sectors.
Countries such as the US, where institutions are likely to be better, are relatively
immune to this bias. For this reason, we believe that US data is the most appropriate
evidence on which to base studies of investment good sectors’ volatility.13
In the theoretical analysis that follows, differences in volatility across sectors are
12Most of the investment goods are classified as equipment. Eaton and Kortum (2001) show that
the production of equipment as percentage of GDP varies greatly across countries. A cursory look at
their data hints that the less equipment–intensive countries tend to have weaker institutions.
13In Section 9 we argue that heterogeneity in volatility could explain international specialization
patterns among investment goods.
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exogenous. We take this route because providing a rationalization for our empirical
finding is not the purpose of this paper. We will assume that firms’ technologies are
subject to TFP-like shocks with sector–specific variances. While we have not experi-
mented with alternative types of disturbances, we believe that the mechanism at the
core of our model would have similar implications under different assumptions on the
stochastic structure. Even though the results of our analysis do not depend on it, we
believe that it would be of independent interest to understand what causes firms in one
sector to face higher idiosyncratic risk than their peers in the other. Accounting for
this heterogeneity may also provide insights into the determinants of the post–WWII
increase in sales volatility recently documented by Comin and Philippon (2005). Our
conjecture is that in the case of most investment and durable consumption goods
there is a greater scope for process and product innovation. Klenow (1996)’s finding
on the distribution of R&D expenditures across 2– and 3–digit industries seem to
be consistent with this hypothesis.14 Our idea is that in these industries firms are
arranged on a quality ladder. The adoption of an innovation ahead of its peers allows
a laggard to advance to the frontier, boosting its sales, possibly in a rather dramatic
way. Conversely, the early adoption by a competitor has the potential to depress its
results. Our argument is in the spirit of the quality ladder models of endogenous
economic growth a` la Grossman and Helpman (1991) and Aghion and Howitt (1992).
We now turn to the model.
3 Model
We consider a simple extension of the standard two–period, two–sector Overlapping
Generations Model. The population is constant and the measure of each cohort is
normalized to one. Individuals are risk–averse. Preferences are time–separable and
the period utility, denoted by u(ct), displays constant relative risk aversion.
15 Let σ
denote the coefficient of relative risk aversion. Agents discount second–period utility
at the rate β; β > 0.
Young individuals are born without any endowment. In order to consume, they
engage in the production of either consumption goods or investment goods. Both
activities require capital, which is borrowed from the old via financial intermediaries.
Old individuals are idle and consume from assets accumulated when young. The
technologies in the two sectors are described by the production functions yCt = zCtk
α
Ct
14See Tables 2 and 3 of that paper, respectively.
15We restrict our attention to the CRRA family, because utility functions in this class display
non–increasing absolute risk aversion and imply indirect utility functions that are log–separable in
the interest rate.
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and yIt = zItk
α
It, respectively, with α ∈ (0, 1). In either sector, capital depreciates
at the constant rate δ ∈ (0, 1). The two sectors only differ with respect to the
distribution of the random variables zCt and zIt. In order to capture the difference
in volatility across sectors documented in Section 2, we assume that the standard
deviation of zIt is always greater than the standard deviation of zCt. For the sake
of simplicity, here we posit that zCt = zC ∈ <+ for all t, while zIt ∈ {zh, zl} ∈ <
2
+,
with zh > zl > 0, and pr {zIt = zh} = ρ, ρ ∈ (0, 1). The hypothesis of no risk in the
consumption good sector will be relaxed in Section 5. The consumption good is the
numeraire. We use pt to denote the price of the investment good and Nt to denote the
fraction of entrepreneurs (i.e. the fraction of young agents) engaged in the production
of investment goods. Finally, we find it useful to define ∆ ≡ zh − zl.
We assume that the output realization is private information for the entrepreneurs.
In the simple model considered here, this matters only for agents operating in the
investment good sector.16 These entrepreneurs have the option of hiding some of
their cash–flows from their financiers. Hiding, however, is costly. For every unit of
cash–flow hidden, an entrepreneur ends up with only ξ ∈ [0, 1].17 The balance is lost
in the hiding process.18 The parameter ξ is our measure of the economy–wide level of
investor protection. The larger is ξ, the lower the protection. The two extreme values
identify the cases of complete absence of protection (ξ = 1) and perfect protection
(ξ = 0). Finally, we assume that the intermediation industry is competitive and entry
is free.
Figure 4 displays the sequence of events during the life of an investment-good
producer. At the outset, he borrows capital, kIt, from an intermediary, then invests
and produces output equal to zItf(kIt). Next, he makes a claim about the outcome
of his project zˆIt ∈ {zh, zl}, gives the intermediary output consistent with this claim,
i.e. zˆItf(kIt), and receives a contingent transfer of consumption good τIt(zˆIt).
19 A
financing contract offered to a sector-I entrepreneur consists of a capital advance, kIt,
and contingent transfers τht ≡ τIt(zh) and τlt ≡ τIt(zl). At the end of the first period,
investment good producers end up with income we denote by mt. If the outcome is
16As already hinted at, this will not be the case in the generalization of this setup to be introduced
in Section 5. There, entrepreneurs producing consumption goods will also face incentives to exploit
their informational advantage.
17Our hiding cost resembles the falsification cost considered by Lacker and Weinberg (1989).
18All of our results follow even when a portion, or the totality of this balance accrues to the
intermediaries. The only caveat is that in such case one needs to work with a continuum of outcomes.
Otherwise, any hiding would be detected by the lender. See the Appendix to Castro, Clementi, and
MacDonald (2004) for details.
19In the appendix to Castro, Clementi, and MacDonald (2004) we show that under our assumptions
the Constrained-Pareto optimal contract always requires the output surrendered to be consistent with
the report. In turn, this implies no hiding along the equilibrium path.
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Figure 4: Timing.
low, necessarily mt = τlt. Having no endowment, an agent is unable to misreport
in the low state, since that would entail surrendering a level of output zhf(kIt).
If the outcome is high, truthful reporting yields mt = τht, and concealing yields
mt = τlt+ξpt∆f(kIt). By misreporting, an entrepreneur receives the transfer intended
for low–outcome projects, τlt, plus the fraction ξ of the hidden output pt∆f(kIt).
The life of entrepreneurs in the consumption good sector is characterized by the
same sequence of events. The only difference is that, their outputs being a determin-
istic function of the inputs, their contracts collapse to a level of capital kCt and an
uncontingent transfer τCt. Their income is necessarily mt = τCt.
At the end of the first stage of their lives, all agents, regardless of their occupations,
consume part of their incomes and save the rest. At the beginning of the second
stage, they lend their savings to intermediaries at the market rate. Intermediaries
channel those funds to the new cohort of young people. At the end of their lives,
agents receive and consume principal plus interest. Notice that the rate rt denotes
the return in consumption goods to the investment of one unit of consumption good.
4 Competitive equilibrium
We start by considering an entrepreneur’s consumption-saving decision. This simple
problem is the same for all agents. Let v(mt, rt+1) denote the indirect utility of an
agent born at time t, conditional on having received an income mt and on facing an
11
interest rate rt+1. Then,
v(mt, rt+1) ≡ u [mt − s(mt, rt+1)] + βu [(1 + rt+1)s(mt, rt+1)] ,
where the optimal saving function s(mt, rt+1) is
s (mt, rt+1) ≡ argmax
s
{u (mt − s) + βu [(1 + rt+1) s]} .
Under our assumptions on preferences, it follows that
s(mt, rt+1) = κ (rt+1)mt (3)
and
v(mt, rt+1) = u(mt)[u(1 − κ(rt+1)) + βu(κ(rt+1)(1 + rt+1))], (4)
where
κ (rt+1) =
1
1 + β−
1
σ (1 + rt+1)
σ−1
σ
.
We now characterize the financing contracts offered to entrepreneurs. Those who
opt for the consumption good sector will implement the efficient scale. Their income
τCt is the value of the following problem:
max
kCt
zCk
α
Ct − (rt + δ)ptkCt. (P1)
Entrepreneurs in the investment good sector will be offered contracts (kIt, τht, τlt) that
solve
max
kIt,τht,τlt
ρv (τht, rt+1) + (1− ρ) v (τlt, rt+1) , (P2)
subject to incentive compatibility for entrepreneurs whose projects are of high quality,
i.e.,
v (τht, rt+1) ≥ v [τlt + ξpt∆k
α
It, rt+1] , (5)
and the zero-profit condition for intermediaries:
τ¯t ≡ ρτht + (1− ρ) τlt = ptz¯Ik
α
It − (rt + δ) ptkIt, (6)
with z¯I = ρzh + (1− ρ)zl. We now define a competitive equilibrium.
Definition 1 Given an initial aggregate capital stock K0 > 0, a competitive equilib-
rium is a non-negative consumption level of the initial old co0, contingent non-negative
consumption allocations for young and old individuals in the investment good sector,
{cyht, c
y
lt}
∞
t=0 and {c
o
ht, c
o
lt}
∞
t=1, non-negative consumption allocations for young and old
individuals in the consumption good sector {cyCt}
∞
t=0 and {c
o
Ct}
∞
t=1, sequences of con-
tracts {kIt, τht, τlt}
∞
t=0 and {kCt, τCt}
∞
t=0, measures of entrepreneurs in the investment
good sectors {Nt}
∞
t=0, relative prices {pt}
∞
t=0, and interest rates {rt}
∞
t=0, such that
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1. co0 = p0K0(1 + r0) and at all t ≥ 0:
2. cyit = τit − s(τit, rt+1) and c
o
it+1 = s(τit, rt+1)(1 + rt+1), for i = h, l;
3. cyCt = τCt − s(τCt, rt+1) and c
o
Ct = s(τCt, rt+1)(1 + rt+1);
4. {kCt, τCt} solves problem (P1);
5. {kIt, τht, τlt} solves problem (P2);
6. Nt ∈ [0, 1];
7. young individuals are indifferent between the two sectors:
v(τCt, rt+1) = ρv(τht, rt+1) + (1− ρ)v(τlt, rt+1); (7)
8. aggregate savings are equal to the value of the capital stock:
ptKt+1 = Nt [ρs (τht, rt+1) + (1− ρ) s (τlt, rt+1)] + (1−Nt)s (τCt, rt+1) ; (8)
9. gross investment equals the production of investment goods:
Kt+1 = (1− δ)Kt +Ntz¯Ik
α
It; (9)
10. the market for capital clears:
Kt = NtkIt + (1−Nt)kCt. (10)
4.1 Benchmark: Perfect investor protection (ξ = 0)
In this section we show that, for ξ = 0, our model reduces to the standard two-period,
two-sector model of capital accumulation. The necessary condition for problem (P1)
is
αzCk
α−1
Ct = (rt + δ)pt. (11)
In turn, this implies that
τCt = (1− α)zCk
α
Ct. (12)
It is easy to see that for ξ = 0, the optimal contract in the investment good sector
implements the first-best allocation. Such allocation must satisfy
αz¯Ik
α−1
It = (rt + δ) (13)
13
and
τIt ≡ τht = τlt = pt(1− α)z¯Ik
α
It. (14)
Conditions (11) and (13) imply that the relative price of the investment good satisfies
pt =
zC
z¯I
(
kCt
kIt
)α−1
. (15)
Using (4), (12), and (14), we can rewrite the occupational choice condition (7) as
u [(1− α)zCk
α
Ct] = u [pt(1− α)z¯Ik
α
It] . (16)
Since u is strictly increasing, conditions (15) and (16) imply that kCt = kIt. This,
along with condition (10), implies that kCt = kIt = Kt, so that pt = zC/z¯I and
τt ≡ τCt = τIt. Finally, by (3), condition (8) leads us to conclude that
Kt+1 = (1− α)κ(rt+1)z¯IK
α
t .
Aggregation holds: the latter condition, along with (13), can be used to recover the
equilibrium sequences forKt and rt. Then, the sequence for Nt can be computed using
condition (9). We close this section noting that for zC = z¯I the model’s implications
are identical to those of the standard one-sector model.
4.2 Imperfect investor protection (ξ ∈ (0, 1])
First, notice that our assumptions on preferences imply that Problem (P2) is inde-
pendent from rt+1. Using condition (4), one can easily show that (P2) reduces to the
following program:
max
kIt,τht,τlt
ρu(τht) + (1− ρ)u(τlt),
subject to u(τht) ≥ u (τlt + ξpt∆k
α
It) , (17)
τ¯It ≡ ρτht + (1− ρ)τlt = pt[z¯Ik
α
It − (rt + δ) kIt].
Strict concavity of the utility function implies that constraint (17) binds. Then, by
strong monotonicity of u(·), it follows that
τht = τlt + ξpt∆k
α
It. (18)
The term τht−τlt = ξpt∆k
α
It is a measure of the income risk borne by entrepreneurs in
the investment good sector. It depends positively on the scale of production and neg-
atively on the level of investor protection. By (18), the contracting problem simplifies
to
max
kIt,τ¯t
ρu [τ¯t + (1− ρ)ξpt∆k
α
It] + (1− ρ)u [τ¯t − ρξpt∆k
α
It] (P3)
subject to τ¯t = pt[z¯Ik
α
It − (rt + δ)kIt].
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The necessary and sufficient condition for maximization is
rt + δ = αk
α−1
It [z¯I + ρ(1− ρ)ξ∆ωt] , (19)
where
ωt ≡
u′(τht)− u
′(τlt)
ρu′(τht) + (1− ρ)u′(τlt)
.
The term ρ(1 − ρ)ξ∆ωt < 0 is the wedge between the private and social marginal
product of capital in the investment good sector, which is induced by imperfect risk-
sharing. To shed some light on its meaning, we rewrite it as
ρ(1− ρ)ξ∆ωt = ξ
ρu′(τht)(zh − z¯I) + (1− ρ)u
′(τlt)(zl − z¯I)
ρu′(τht) + (1− ρ)u′(τlt)
.
In turn, this allows to rewrite condition (19) as
[αz¯Itk
α−1
It − (rt + δ)][ρu
′(τht) + (1− ρ)u
′(τlt)] =
− αkα−1It [ρu
′(τht)(zh − z¯I) + (1− ρ)u
′(τlt)(zl − z¯I)].
The term on the left-hand side is the marginal benefit of increasing capital. Raising
kIt affects the resources available for distribution to the entrepreneur in all states of
nature. The term on the right-hand side is the marginal cost of increasing capital.
This becomes evident once one realizes that τjt = τ¯t + ξpt[zj − z¯]k
α
It for j = h, l.
Incentive compatibility implies that a larger capital can be accommodated only at
the cost of a higher variance in entrepreneurial income.
Proposition 1 shows that under our assumptions on preferences, the transfers are
linear in the output level and the wedge is scale–invariant.
Proposition 1 For all t ≥ 0, τht = ptghk
α
It and τlt = ptglk
α
It for some positive
constants gh and gl. Furthermore, ωt = ω =
g−σ
h
−g−σ
l
ρg−σh +(1−ρ)g
−σ
l
.
Proof. We use conditions (17) and (18) to express τht and τlt as functions of kIt:
τjt = pt[(z¯I(1− ξ) + ξzj) k
α
It − (rt + δ) kIt], j = h, l.
By (19), we can rewrite the latter expression as
τjt = ptk
α
It[(1− α− ξ)z¯I − αρ(1− ρ)ξ∆ωt + ξzj ], j = h, l.
We now conjecture that τht = ptghk
α
It and τlt = ptglk
α
It. For our conjecture to be
verified, the constants gh and gl must solve the following system:
gh = (1− α− ξ)z¯I − αρ(1 − ρ)ξ∆ωt + ξzh, (20)
gl = (1− α− ξ)z¯I − αρ(1 − ρ)ξ∆ωt + ξzl, (21)
ω =
g−σh − g
−σ
l
ρg−σh + (1 − ρ)g
−σ
l
. (22)
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It is straightforward to check that there always exist strictly positive constants gh and
gl that solve (20)–(22). Since the solution to (P3) is unique, the result holds.
As a consistency check, one can verify that for ξ = 0 condition (19) reduces to
rt + δ = αz¯Ik
α−1
It and that gh = gl = (1 − α)z¯I . We are back to the case analyzed in
Section 4.1.
Proposition 2 establishes that the size of the wedge between private and social
marginal product of capital is larger, the poorer the quality of institutions. Intuition
for this result can be gained by inspecting condition (18). It reveals that in this
framework adding one unit of capital increases uninsured idiosyncratic risk at a rate
that is strictly increasing in ξ. Therefore for given interest rate the privately optimal
firm scale will be decreasing in ξ, and for given scale the average transfer τ¯t will be
increasing in ξ.
Proposition 2 The term ω =
g−σ
h
−g−σ
l
ρg−σ
h
+(1−ρ)g−σ
l
is strictly decreasing in ξ.20
Let’s now turn our attention to the relative price pt. Let Qt ≡ kCt/kIt. By
Proposition 1, conditions (11) and (19) allow us to express the relative price of the
investment good as
pt =
zC
z¯I + ρ(1− ρ)ξ∆ω
Qα−1t . (23)
Proposition 1 also allows us to rewrite the occupational choice condition (7) as
u[(1− α)zCk
α
Ct] = ρu(ptghk
α
It) + (1− ρ)u(ptglk
α
It).
Solving the latter for pt yields
pt =
(1− α)zC
[ρg1−σh + (1− ρ)g
1−σ
l ]
1/(1−σ)
Qαt . (24)
One can easily solve (23) and (24) for pt and Qt. Interestingly, both variables turn
out to be time-invariant.
Corollary 1 For all t ≥ 0, pt = p and Qt = Q.
This finding allows us to characterize the relation between p and ξ without having
to compute the whole competitive equilibrium allocation. Proposition 3 establishes
that the relative price of capital is higher, the poorer the investor protection.
Proposition 3 The relative price of capital p is strictly increasing in ξ.
20Proofs not reported in the main body of the paper can be found in Appendix B.
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Figure 5 gives a qualitative rendering of the comparative statics of p and Q with
respect to ξ. The exercise characterizes the effects of worsening investor protection
(increasing ξ from ξ0 to ξ1). The schedules labeled FOC and IND depict the relations
between p and Q implied by equations (23) and (24), respectively. Solid lines refer to
the case of high investor protection (ξ0). Dotted lines instead refer to the case of low
protection (ξ1).
The IND schedule is upward sloping because as Q = kCt/kIt increases, an increase
in the relative price is needed to keep agents indifferent between the two occupations.
Also, recall that poorer investor protection means less risk-sharing. This is reflected
in the relation gh = gl+ ξ∆. This implies that the compensating increase in the price
must be larger, the poorer the investor protection. As a consequence, IND becomes
steeper as ξ increases. Let’s now turn to the FOC schedule. It is simply the locus
of the (p,Q) pairs consistent with the equality of the marginal products, expressed in
capital goods. These are αkα−1It [z¯I + ρ(1− ρ)ξ∆ω] and αz¯Ck
α−1
Ct /p. To maintain such
equality as p increases, kC must decrease with respect to kI . As investor protection
deteriorates, such decrease becomes smaller, since higher ξ implies a larger wedge
|ρ(1− ρ)ξ∆ω|. This is why FOC1 lies above FOC0.
-
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Figure 5: Comparative statics with respect to ξ.
The bottom line is that both curves shift upwards as ξ increases. As a result, the
relative price necessarily increases.
It turns out that Q is also monotone increasing in ξ.21 Should this be a robust
implication of our assumptions, it would provide a testable restriction. However, this
21See Appendix B for a proof of this claim.
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particular result is not general. When we allow for a continuum of states and for risk
in the consumption sector (see Section 5) or for ex-ante heterogeneity (see Appendix
C), Q is monotone increasing in ξ only on a subset of the parameter space.
We now turn to the full characterization of the equilibrium. Notice that condition
(10) implies that kIt =
Kt
Nt+(1−Nt)Q
. We can substitute this expression into equations
(8), (9), and (11), to obtain
pKt+1 = κ(rt+1)
[
Kt
Nt + (1−Nt)Q
]α
[pNt(ρgh + (1− ρ)gl) + (1−Nt)(1 − α)zCQ
α],
(25)
Kt+1 = (1− δ)Kt +Ntz¯I
(
Kt
Nt + (1−Nt)Q
)α
, (26)
p(rt + δ) = αzC
(
QKt
Nt + (1−Nt)Q
)α−1
. (27)
Once computed p and Q, and given K0, the three conditions above are sufficient to
characterize the equilibrium paths for Kt, Nt, and rt.
22 The sequence of consumption
allocations and the other quantities of interest can be easily recovered using the
relations outlined earlier in this section.
Recall that our ultimate objective is to evaluate whether our theory can account for
the development facts described in the Introduction. To this end, in the next section
we introduce and parameterize a more general version of our model. In Sections 6
and 7 we use it to conduct a comparative steady-state analysis with respect to the
parameter ξ. Finally, in Section 8 we conduct a quantitative exercise: we ask whether
the model is able to generate as much cross-country dispersion in relative prices and
investment rates as in the 1996 Penn World Tables.
5 Calibration
We amend the setup introduced in Section 3 along three dimensions: (i) we allow for
risk in the consumption good sector, (ii) productivity shocks are now continuously
distributed, and (iii) we introduce exogenous productivity growth. These changes
yield a model which is better suited for quantitative analysis. Production in sector
22Solving equation (27) for rt+1 and substituting it into (25) yields a bi-dimensional dynamical
system in Kt and Nt. This implies that, in general, the initial condition K0 is not enough to
determine a solution. In our case, however, it is. This is because, as it turns out, a competitive
equilibrium must be a saddle point path. When initialized with pairs (K0, N0) not on the saddle-
point path, the system generates sequences that violate one or more equilibrium conditions in finite
time. We are not able to prove that the saddle-path solution is unique, but numerical results hint
that this is the case. Thus, for given K0, N0 is pinned down by the requirement that the pair be on
the saddle path.
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j, j = I, C, is still given by yjt = zjtk
α
jt. The random variable zjt, however, is
now continuously distributed on the set (γtzmin,+∞), zmin > 0.
23 We assume that
log
(
zjt − γ
tzmin
)
∼ N(µj , η
2
j ). In the engineering literature, γ
tzmin is sometimes
known as shift or location parameter. Heuristically, the distribution of zjt shifts to
the right at the rate γ.24
In picking our parameter values, we consider a world economy consisting of a unit
measure of countries, each of which drew its value of ξ from the set [0, 1], according
to the uniform probability distribution. This way, our model induces a distribution
in the space of relative price and balanced-growth investment rate. Countries live in
autarky. International trade and capital flows will be allowed for in Sections 7 and 8.
The parameter values are listed in Table 1. Individuals are assumed to have a
productive life of 60 years. This implies a 30-year model period. The parameter
σ is set to 1.5, a standard value in quantitative analysis and consistent with the
empirical evidence. The discount factor β is such that the annual real interest rate in
the United States, the country we associate with perfect investor protection (ξ = 0),
equals 6.5%. The parameter α is set to 1/3, the value considered by other studies
of entrepreneurial behavior such as Burstein and Monge-Naranjo (2005) and Buera
(2003).25 We compute the world average annual growth rate of real GDP per worker
to be about 2.3% in the Penn World Tables, equivalent to a 30-year growth rate of
output of 97.8%. This observation implies that γ = 1.9781−α. We set the annual
depreciation rate to 8%, to ensure an investment rate in the US of 20%, about the
same as in the data. The world’s relative price of investment goods, pw, is obtained
as the cross-country average of the relative prices produced by the model.
The remaining four parameters are those characterizing the distributions of z in
the two sectors. Calibrating them is obviously a key element of our analysis. Since
there are no scale effects in our model, we can normalize one of the means. We decide
to set µC so that z¯C = 1. We select ηC and ηI so that the standard deviations of
the sales growth rates in the consumption and in the investment good sectors are
0.048 and 0.12, respectively. These are our estimates of sales growth rate volatility in
the Food Manufacturing and in the Computer and Electronic Product Manufacturing
23The lower bound zmin is introduced for technical reasons that are discussed in Appendix D.
24The equilibrium allocation of this more general model is entirely analogous to that described in
Section 4. For this reason, we confine it to Appendix D.
25Atkeson and Kehoe (2005) find that the share of income accruing to capital in the US is only 0.2.
We are hesitant in adopting their value, because in our model the only two factors of production are
physical capital and entrepreneurial ability. It turns out, however, that the model’s implications do
not change in any appreciable way when we re-calibrate it with α = 0.2. In particular, the qualitative
patterns illustrated by Figure 6 are unchanged. The quantitative exercise in Section 8 below was also
performed for both values of α, yielding very similar results.
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β σ α δ γ µC ηC µI ηI zmin
0.194 1.5 1/3 0.918 1.576 -0.405 0.051 -21.654 6.677 0.332
Table 1: Parameter Values
sector, respectively (see Table 4 in Appendix A).26 We would also like to set µI in
order to match the average sales growth rate in the investment good sector (or its
ratio to the average growth in the consumption good sector). Unfortunately, in our
simple model there is no mapping between µI and that moment of the sales growth
distribution. By construction, average sales growth rates are identically zero in our
setup, in both sectors. Therefore, we set µI so that the model-implied cross-country
variation in the relative price of investment goods (with respect to the US) matches
its observed value. Given the high nonlinearity of our model and the restrictions
imposed by the remaining parameters, it is not guaranteed that such a µI exists.
As it turns out, however, our model can indeed generate the observed dispersion in
relative prices.
6 Comparative Statics
Our theory predicts that the quality of legal institutions should be negatively cor-
related with the relative price of capital goods. The purpose of this section is to
develop implications for the co-variation between the quality of legal institutions and
other variables of interest for development economics, among which GDP and the
investment rate, measured both in domestic and international prices. To this effect,
we characterize the steady-state relationship between the parameter ξ and those vari-
ables. Figure 6 depicts the steady-state values implied by all ξ ∈ [0, 1]. The remaining
parameter values are those listed in Table 1. Unless otherwise noted, the figures are
expressed relative to the outcome under perfect investor protection (ξ = 0).
Consistently with Proposition 3, the relative price of capital is higher, the poorer
the investor protection. We have already argued that this happens because under
our assumption on the cross-sectoral variation in baseline idiosyncratic risk, poor
26Strictly speaking, our model does not produce implications for firms’ sales growth rate. This is
because firms operate for one model’s period only. We define the time–t economy-wide detrended
average growth rate in sector j as
 
Z
 
Z
log

z′kˆαj,t+1
zkˆα
jt 
fj(z)fj(z
′)dzdz′, where Z = (zmin,+∞) and
fj(z) is the density of the lognormal distribution with shift parameter zmin. In balanced-growth
steady state, such statistic is always zero by construction. Therefore the model’s standard deviation
of the sales growth rate boils down to the square root of
 
Z
 
Z 
log z
′
z 
2
fj(z)fj(z
′)dzdz′. Our
definition of growth rate can be rationalized by assuming that the technologies are infinitely lived
and are passed down from generation to generation.
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investor protection introduces a distortion in the allocation of resources between the
investment good and the consumption good sector. Such distortion is also responsible
for the lower levels of capital stock and GDP.
Now consider the first two panels on the bottom row. They depict the steady–
state values of the investment rate measured using domestic and international prices,
respectively. In the first case, the relevant price is the equilibrium value implied
by ξ (which is plotted in the third panel on the first row). The investment rate
is simply I/Y = pNz¯Ik
α
I /[pNz¯Ik
α
I + (1−N) z¯Ck
α
C ]. This quantity does not vary
substantially with investor protection, because the relative price adjusts for the change
in investor protection. In the second case, the relevant price is the average relative
price (i.e. the mean of the prices in the third panel on the first row, with respect to
the uniform distribution). The investment rate is Ippp/Y ppp = pwNz¯Ik
α
I /[p
wNz¯Ik
α
I +
(1−N) z¯Ck
α
C ]. Notice that the comparative statics of this quantity does not depend
on the particular value assumed by pw. What matters is pw’s invariance to the quality
of institutions.
Figure 6 also shows that measured TFP declines with ξ. Consistently with the
empirical literature,27 the Solow residual is computed as Z = Y PPPK−α, where
Y PPP = pwNz¯Ik
α
I + (1−N)z¯Ck
α
C . This yields:
Z = z¯C
[
pwz¯I
z¯C
N
(
kI
K
)α
+ (1−N)
(
kC
K
)α]
= z¯C
[
pwz¯I
z¯C
N
(
1
N + (1−N)Q
)α
+ (1−N)
(
Q
N + (1−N)Q
)α]
. (28)
The above expressions help understanding why measured TFP varies across countries
even in the absence of any heterogeneity in technology. As long as countries differ
in investor protection, they will be characterized by different allocations of factors
(capital and entrepreneurs) across sectors. That is, in general Q and N will vary with
ξ. In the case of our parameterization, Q is basically invariant; the scale of produc-
tion is about the same across sectors. Measured TFP drops because the fraction of
entrepreneurs active in the investment good sector decreases with ξ. Obviously this
argument is correct if and only if pw > zC/z¯I . This condition is always satisfied, since
z¯C/z¯I , the domestic price for a country with perfect investor protection, also consti-
tutes the lower bound for the world price. Because of imperfect investor protection,
the international price of investment goods is higher than the social marginal rate of
27See for example Hall and Jones (1999) and Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (1997).
21
0 0.5 1
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
0 0.5 1
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
0 0.5 1
0
2
4
6
8
0 0.5 1
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
0 0.5 1
6
6.2
6.4
6.6
0 0.5 1
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
0 0.5 1
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
0 0.5 1
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
0 0.5 1
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Aggregate Capital (Kt) Entrepreneurs - I (Nt) Relative Price (pt)
kCt/kIt Interest Rate (rt) PPP GDP
I/Y PPP I/Y PPP TFP
a
n
n
u
a
li
ze
d
ra
te
in
%
Figure 6: Steady–State Values for ξ ∈ [0, 1].
transformation. Therefore any factor reallocation away from the investment sector
reduces measured TFP.28 In conclusion, cross-country differences in legal institutions
are able to generates differences not only in accumulation rates, but also in measured
aggregate total factor productivity.
We now find it useful to relate our findings to the literature. Chari, Kehoe, and
McGrattan (1996) and Restuccia and Urrutia (2001) have argued that inefficiencies
28Equation (28) indicates that measured TFP is monotone increasing in the world price. This
implies that while the ranking of countries with respect to measured TFP is invariant to changes in
pw, the cross–country variation in this variable is not. In turn, this means that our distributional
assumption for ξ matters for the magnitude of the cross–country dispersion in TFP.
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specific to the investment–good producing sector can account for the evidence on
relative prices and investment rates. These inefficiencies, or wedges, may be the result
of explicit taxation, tariffs, regulation, corruption, or other economic rents.29 The
purpose of those papers is not to understand which, among these, are the most likely
determinants of the distortions. For this reason, no effort is made to assemble direct
evidence on their distribution across countries and compare it to the distribution of
wedges inferred from the dispersion of relative prices.
Hsieh and Klenow (2003) have used a version of the two–sector neoclassical growth
model to discriminate among a few possible explanations of the key development
regularities. They have considered cross-country differences in saving propensities,
in explicit taxes or tariffs specific to investment goods, in capital income taxes, and
in sectoral TFPs. Their conclusion is that the development regularities are only
consistent with rich countries being more productive (having an absolute advantage)
and having a comparative advantage in the production of investment goods. Taxes
and tariffs targeting investment goods are among the wedges that fit the definition
of distortion considered by Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (1996) and Restuccia and
Urrutia (2001). Hsieh and Klenow (2003) notice that, investment good being widely
traded across countries, their net prices (net of taxes and tariffs) should be fairly
similar across countries. Hence, there should be a tendency for gross prices to be
higher in less developed countries. This prediction appears to be counterfactual. The
prices reported in the Penn World Tables, which are gross of all explicit taxes, do not
tend to be negatively associated with incomes.
Hsieh and Klenow’s (2003) work leaves the remaining investment wedges (all but
taxes and tariffs) and sectoral TFP differences as candidate explanations. In the
context of Hsieh and Klenow’s (2003) setup, it is impossible to tell them apart, because
their implications for macro aggregates are identical. If we denote the sectoral TFPs
as AC and AI and the investment wedge as θ, their model implies that the relative
price of investment goods is PI/PC = (1+ θ)AC/AI .
30 One can also easily show that
the whole equilibrium allocation is a function of the composite term (1+θ)AC/AI . It
follows that macro observations cannot help us distinguishing the role of cross-country
variation in AC/AI from that of cross-country variation in θ.
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29As these two papers make clear, the explicit taxation interpretation differs from the remaining
interpretations in that the aggregate resource constraint remains unchanged in the former case, but
not in the latter. This difference, however, does not affect the implications for the variables of interest
in a significant way.
30This is true provided that (i) the technologies display constant returns to scale and are identical
across sectors up to a multiplicative TFP parameter, (ii) input markets are perfectly competitive,
and (iii) inputs are perfectly mobile across sectors.
31A similar observation applies to our model. Assume ξ = 0, so that investor protection is perfect
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In order to make progress towards understanding why certain countries face higher
prices of capital and invest less, we need to understand what these investment wedges
really are. At the very least, this is a necessary condition for formulating policy
recommendations. In turn, this objective can only be accomplished by studying
microfounded models. This is exactly what we do in this paper. Micro–foundations
are needed because they allow for falsification. Our exercise highlights why this is the
case. Not only must it be the case that the parameter ξ belongs to the interval [0, 1].
Tying the investment wedge to the level of investor protection and to the variation
in idiosyncratic risk, our theory generate two further restrictions: (i) the distribution
of ξ must be consistent with the cross–country evidence on the quality of institutions
and (ii) the levels of idiosyncratic risk in the consumption and investment good sectors
must agree with the data presented in Section 2.32 The test for our mechanism is
to generate sizeable variation in investment rates and relative prices while satisfying
these restrictions. We will get to that in Section 8.
7 International Trade
So far we have proceeded under the assumption of closed economy. Do our conclusions
change if we allow for international trade and for international capital flows? If yes,
how? This section is devoted to answering these questions.
7.1 Intra-temporal Trade
If investment goods are fully tradable while consumption goods are not, and bor-
rowing and lending is not allowed, then the predictions characterized in Sections 4
and 6 stand intact. In this scenario, the absolute domestic price of the investment
good equals the price prevailing in international markets, but there is no trade in
equilibrium. Our model still pins down the relative price (i.e. the absolute price of
the consumption good) and the comparative statics is unchanged. In particular, the
model still predicts that the relative price of capital goods is negatively associated
with investor protection. The novelty is that its variation is uniquely due to the
variation in the absolute price of consumption goods, which will be lower, the poorer
in all countries. Suppose also that investment good producers need to pay (1+ θ)(r+ δ) for each unit
of capital they rent. Then it is easy to establish that p = (1+θ)αz¯C/z¯I . Because of decreasing returns
to scale in production, however, the allocation is not a function of a composite term of 1 + θ and
z¯C/z¯I . In spite of this, variation in θ and in z¯C/z¯I still generate qualitatively identical implications
for the variables of interest.
32Notice that these restrictions bind. If, contrary to the evidence presented in Section 8, idiosyn-
cratic risk was higher in the consumption good sector, our model would predict that poor countries
face lower relative prices of capital!
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investor protection (and income per worker). As already noted, this is consistent with
the data.
If we also allowed for trade in consumption goods, the domestic relative price
would be tied to its world-wide level. Countries would specialize. Those with low
ξ (relative to a threshold determined by the world’s equilibrium relative price of in-
vestment) would produce only investment goods, whereas those with relatively high
ξ would specialize in consumption goods. The empirical evidence shows that most
investment goods are tradeable, while many consumption goods are not. Among the
latter are many services. What would happen then, if we assumed one investment
good and two consumption goods, of which one tradable and the other not? Countries
would end up producing either one of the tradable goods, along with the non-tradable
one. Within the countries producing investment goods (those with better legal insti-
tutions), differences in investor protection would still generate variation in the relative
price of investment goods. However, this would not be the case within countries pro-
ducing the tradeable consumption. For them, any variation in the relative price of
investment would originate in cross-country differences in productivity in the traded
consumption good sector relative to productivity in the non–traded consumption good
sector. A further implication of allowing for a perfectly tradeable consumption good
is that even though the relative price of investment would still vary across countries,
there would be no variation in the price of investment relative to tradable consump-
tion. This appears to be counterfactual. Hsieh and Klenow (2003) provide evidence
suggesting that the price of investment relative to the price of tradable consumption
does covary with income, although less than the price of investment relative to the
price of total consumption.33
Our conclusion is that free trade is probably not a sensible assumption. As long as
there are some impediments to trade, the mechanism outlined in the previous sections
for closed economies produces the same qualitative results for open economies.
7.2 Intertemporal Trade
We now consider the case of free capital flows. We still maintain that only capital
goods are tradable, but we allow domestic financial intermediaries to lend and borrow
capital from the rest of the world at the interest rate prevailing abroad. In this version
of our model, the capital stock owned by domestic entrepreneurs (the national capital
KSt ) will be different from the capital employed by domestic agents (the domestic
33In particular, we refer to Table 4 of their paper, which shows that the absolute price of nontradable
consumption (essentially services) still correlates positively with income.
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capital KDt ). The difference K
S
t −K
D
t is the net outflow of capital to the rest of the
world.
Notice that since the consumption good cannot be traded or stored, domestic
consumption must equal domestic production of consumption goods.34 Now assume
for simplicity that the world-wide interest rate is constant at the level r. In this
scenario, no matter its initial value KS0 , the economy will jump to the steady state.
For this reason, we drop time indexes. The relative price p and relative size Q are
independent of the interest rate and can be recovered as in Section 4. Then the
necessary condition for contract optimality in the consumption good sector yields kC
and therefore kI . Imposing equality between domestic consumption and domestic
production of consumption goods pins down the fraction of agents in the investment
good sector.
Poorer protection is associated with an outflow of capital, i.e. KS > KD, and
a trade balance surplus: financial intermediaries in poor-protection countries invest
their clients’ savings abroad and use the factor payment to purchase new capital from
foreign producers. The current account is in equilibrium: the trade balance equals
net factor income from abroad. To see this, write GDP in domestic prices as the sum
of consumption, investment, and the trade balance:
Y ≡ (1−N)z¯Ck
α
C + pδK
s + p[Nz¯Ik
α
I − δK
s].
Then express it as the sum of the incomes distributed to entrepreneurs and factor
owners:
Y ≡ p
KS
κ(r)
+ p(r + δ)KD.
Since the consumption good market clears, imposing that the two expressions above
be equal and realizing that p(Ks−Kd)(r+δ) is net factor income from abroad, yields
the result.
It is immediate to show that kC , kI and N all fall when ξ increases. Numerical
experiments indicate that the qualitative responses of all other variables to changes
in investor protection are the same as in Sections 4 and 6. Figure 7 illustrates this
result. The figure also hints that when capital flows are allowed for, the responses of
most variables are starker.
This is due to differences in the elasticity of capital supply. In the closed economy
case, such elasticity is positive and finite. Via its negative effect on entrepreneurs’
34The definition of equilibrium is the obvious modification of Definition 1 and is omitted for the
sake of brevity.
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Figure 7: Steady–State Values for ξ ∈ [0, 1] (solid line = closed economy; dashed line
= open economy).
demand for capital, poorer protection implies a lower interest rate, and therefore a
redistribution of resources from agents with low propensity to save (the elderly) to
agents with higher propensity (the young).35 In the open economy case instead, the
elasticity of capital supply is infinite.
8 Quantitative Assessment
Having fully characterized the qualitative implications of our model, we now ask
whether it can account for a sizeable fraction of the cross–country dispersion in relative
investment prices and PPP investment rates. To answer this question, we examine
the joint cross-country distribution of prices and investment rates induced by the
35See Castro, Clementi, and MacDonald (2004) for a careful description of this mechanism.
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calibration procedure described in Section 5. Our methodology involves assuming
the existence of a continuum of countries, identical in every respect but the level of
investor protection. The parameter ξ is assumed to be uniformly distributed across
countries, over its natural domain [0, 1].
The joint distribution is illustrated by the solid line in Figure 8. Such line is simply
the locus of relative investment prices and PPP investment rates predicted by the
model, relative to the US values. For the purpose of comparison, it is superimposed
on the scatter plot of the data. The extreme point of the line to the North–West
represents the country with the best investor protection, which we associate with the
United States. The extreme point to the South–East identifies the country with the
poorest investor protection.
Recall from Section 5 that the choices of all parameter values but one are based
upon either independent micro evidence or long-run information not directly related
to the cross-country dispersion. The sole exception is the mean parameter µI , which
we pick so that the model generates a cross–country variation in relative prices equal
to the value implied by the 1996 Penn World Table.
The object of interest is the cross-country dispersion in investment rates that our
model generates. We find that the standard deviation of investment rates is equal to
43% of the value that emerges from the 1996 Penn World Table.
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Figure 8: Dispersion in Relative Prices and PPP Investment Rates.
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The dashed line is the relative price–investment rate locus implied by the model
under free capital flows.36 Consistently with what argued in Section 7, the response
of capital accumulation to changes in investor protection is stronger. The model can
account for 55% of the variation in investment rates.37
Our simple exercise hints that cross–country differences in legal institutions may
account for a significant share of the observed dispersion in relative prices and invest-
ment rates. Unfortunately, the parsimony of our setup prevents us from being more
ambitious. A more general environment would allow for a better match between the-
ory and data. We find it particularly unfortunate that, as already argued in Section
5, our model does not allow for a tighter match between the parameters of the pro-
ductivity distributions and the moments of the empirical sales growth distribution.
This issue could be addressed simply by letting entrepreneurs operate for more than
one period. We have not pursued this route because it would result in a much less
clean characterization of the contracting problem.
So far, the only restriction we have imposed on the cross-country distribution of ξ
comes from the theory: it must be that ξ ∈ [0, 1]. Can we derive further restrictions
from the data? This is equivalent to asking whether we can identify an empirical
counterpart to our parameter ξ. In the affirmative case, we could obtain direct esti-
mates of ξ to impose on our model. In recent years, several scholars have attempted
to directly assess the variation in the quality of institutions across countries. These
attempts involve assigning scores to countries based on the provisions of the law, their
enforcement, and the distribution of powers across institutions. Among the indicators
produced by this literature, those provided by La Porta, Lopez-de Silanes, Shleifer,
and Vishny (1998) (LLSV from now on) appear to be the most relevant for our anal-
ysis. They are geared to measure the extent to which the letter of the law protects
creditors’ rights (the case of the CR indicator) and minority shareholders’ rights (in-
dicators OV and AR), and the extent to which the law is actually enforced (the RL
indicator).38 Unfortunately the information contained in these variables cannot be
used to generate an empirical distribution of ξ. We believe that this is the case for two
36Rather than explicitly solving for the world equilibrium, we assume that the interest is equal to
the US value. Since the equilibrium prices do not depend on the level of the interest rate, the price
dispersion is the same in the cases of autarky and trade. Only the dispersion in investment rates is
different.
37When the model is re-calibrated to accommodate α = 0.2, the closed and open economy models
account for 51% and 57% of the volatility, respectively.
38The variable CR is higher, the wider the range of creditor rights in firm reorganization and
liquidation upon default. The indicator anti-director rights, AR, and the dummy one share-one
vote, OV , are two indices geared towards assessing the ability of small shareholders to participate in
decision-making. Finally, the index rule of law, RL, proxies for the quality of law enforcement.
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reasons. A first issue is the ordinal nature of the indicators. A second is that ex-ante
we do not have elements to select one or a particular combination of indicators as the
most informative about ξ.
In spite of our assessment that the LLSV’s indicators are unsuitable for calibration
purposes, we find it interesting to compare their cross-country distributions with the
model–implied distribution of ξ. The latter object is the list of values for ξ that our
quantitative exercise implicitly associates with each country in the LLSV’s dataset.
By now it should be clear that our analysis implies a systematic association of ξ with
PPP investment rates and relative prices: negative in the former case and positive in
the latter. In turn, this means that the empirical distributions of both relative prices
and investment rates can be thought of as proxies for the distribution of ξ.
Table 2: Relative Prices, Investment Rates, and Investor Protection
Dependent Variables: Relative Price (log) PPP Investment Rate (log)
Rule of law (RL) -0.09430∗∗∗ 0.09611∗∗∗
(0.01129) (0.01610)
One share-one vote (OV) -0.20344∗∗ 0.35406∗∗
(0.07628) (0.14892)
Antidirector rights (AR) 0.01289 -0.02079
(0.02372) (0.04141)
Creditor rights (CR) 0.04844 -0.01924
(0.02979) (0.04094)
Constant 0.66282∗∗∗ 2.32723∗∗∗
(0.12289) (0.19778)
Number of countries 46 46
Adjusted R2 0.538 0.323
Note: White robust standard errors in parenthesis.
Sources: Heston, Summers, and Aten (2002) and La Porta, Lopez-de Silanes,
Shleifer, and Vishny (1998).
∗∗∗Significant at 1%; ∗∗Significant at 5%.
Table 2 reports the results of regressing relative investment prices and PPP invest-
ment rates on the LLSV’s indicators. It turns out that RL and OV co–vary negatively
with our proxies for ξ, whereas CR and AR are not significantly correlated with them.
This suggests that among the measures of investor protection considered by LLSV,
law enforcement is the one that is likely to matter the most for risk–sharing.
9 Extensions
Our simple model illustrates how, in the presence of cross–sectoral differences in
idiosyncratic risk, changes in investor protection may cause the reallocation of factors
(entrepreneurs and capital) across consumption and investment good sectors, giving
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rise to changes in relative prices and investment rates. In order to best clarify the
working of this mechanisms, we have disregarded other important margins along which
actual economies may adjust to changes in risk–sharing brought about by institutional
differences. In this section we briefly discuss some of these margins and we argue that
considering them could help understanding other facets of economic development.
To start with, we have abstracted completely from ex-ante differences in en-
trepreneurial ability. Accounting for the fact that people are born with different
skills may be important. In Appendix C we extend our model to accommodate for
some ex–ante heterogeneity. Agents are assumed to be equally successful in the con-
sumption good sector, but to differ in their ability to manage technologies in the
investment good sector. The allocation of skill across sectors becomes a function of
investor protection. A decrease in investor protection can lead to the reallocation of
individuals away from the sector where they enjoy a comparative advantage. In turn,
this can result in greater effects on investment rates, income, and measured TFP.
Now think of heterogeneity in capital goods. As already noted in Section 2, Eaton
and Kortum (2001), among others, distinguish between equipment and structures.
They find that the production of equipment is concentrated in a few countries, which
turn out to be among those with better investor protection. If equipment goods–
producing firms face higher idiosyncratic risk – as it seems quite reasonable in the case
of electronics and other high–tech products – a version of the open–economy model
presented in Section 7, amended to allow for heterogeneous capital goods, would yield
predictions consistent with their finding. Countries endowed with relatively better
institutions would specialize in the production of riskier goods. Certain high–tech,
high–risk equipment–producing sectors may not arise at all in countries with relatively
poorer investor protection. Once again, the effects of low institutional quality would
be farther–reaching than implied by our simple setup. Conventional wisdom suggests
that entrepreneurial activities leading to technological innovations are also likely to
be among the riskier ones. If this is the case, our theory suggests that innovative
activities should be concentrated in high–investor protection countries. In turn, this
means that institutions may have a long–term growth effect.
Think also of the underground economy. Most developing countries have large
informal sectors. The ability to borrow from banks is often cited among the reasons
that lead firms to emerge into the formal sector and start paying taxes. Credit from
official sources makes entrepreneurs visible. Better investor protection, by improving
risk–sharing, may increase the incentive to abandon the informal sector.
Finally, a key element of our analysis is the interaction between the sources of
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cross–country variation (in investor protection) and of cross–sectoral variation. For
our argument to go through, the marginal effect of decreasing investor protection
must be larger in investment-good producing sectors. In this paper we have focused
on a particular type of cross–sectoral variation (in idiosyncratic risk) and we have
shown that, when introduced in a fairly standard model of capital accumulation, it
satisfies the requirement. We realize that considering other forms of cross–sectoral
variation may lead to similar results. According to Rajan and Zingales (1998), firms
engaged in the production of investment goods need to rely on external finance to
a larger extent than their counterparts producing consumption goods.39 This may
be the case, we conjecture, because they tend to incur larger initial sunk costs. We
think that it is possible to model this alternative form of heterogeneity in such a
way that entrepreneurs in investment good sectors are able to finance themselves at
a relative lower cost in countries characterized by better investor protection. Besides
representing an interesting exercise on its own, constructing such model would give
us the chance to contrast the explanatory power of the two types of heterogeneity.
10 Conclusion
We introduced investor protection in a simple model of firm finance with asymmetric
information and risk-averse entrepreneurs, along the lines of Castro, Clementi, and
MacDonald (2004). In this framework it is easy to show that the poorer the protec-
tion, the lesser the risk-sharing achieved by entrepreneurs and the lower the resources
they obtain from outside investors. Imbedding such model of firm finance in a general
equilibrium two-sector model of capital accumulation allowed us to characterize the
implications of different levels of investor protection for aggregate variables such as
per-capita income, investment rates, and relative prices. We also provided novel em-
pirical evidence, indicating that firm–level idiosyncratic risk is higher in investment–
good producing industries. Imposing this restriction on the model, we showed that
imperfect investor protection induces a wedge between the rates of return on in-
vestment in the two sectors. Such wedge entails an inefficiency in the competitive
allocation, distracting resources away from the investment good sector and towards
the consumption good sector. In turn, this implies an increase in the relative price of
capital and a decrease in the investment rate and, ultimately, income. Importantly,
the size of the inefficiency and its effect on relative price, investment rate, and in-
39This is not exactly the classification adopted by the authors. However, even a cursory look at
their data reveals that investment–good producing sectors tend to be classified as sectors in which
firms require larger access to external finance.
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come, is larger, the poorer the investor protection. Our main conclusion is that the
cross-country variation in the quality of the legal institutions that safeguard investors’
rights may be responsible for generating the observed correlation between income per
worker, relative price of capital, and investment rate.
We see our paper as contributing to an important line of research that tries to
understand why countries have such widely different development experiences. We
have proposed a micro–founded model that features an explicit link between the qual-
ity of institutions, sectoral differences in idiosyncratic volatility, and macroeconomic
outcomes. Our analysis shows that this mechanism can account for several important
aspects of the cross–country variation in development experiences. Our emphasis on
micro–foundations brings several advantages. Most importantly, it yields restrictions
that are very helpful in assessing the validity of the model.
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A Data
Our data draws from the COMPUSTAT North-America Industrial Annual Database
from 1950 to 2003. After dropping all observations for which either net sales, em-
ployment, or the NAICS code are missing, our dataset consists of 247,592 firm-year
observations. We then proceed to delete all firms that have less than 3 observations
and those belonging to 3-digit NAICS sectors for which the yearly average number
of firms in the sample is less than 4. We also eliminate all firm-year observations
which are affected by a merger or acquisition since the previous year, and those for
which the COMPUSTAT has indicated a potential accounting problem in net sales,
based upon the information contained in this item’s footnote codes. Finally, we drop
all firms in the Finance and Insurance (3-digit NAICS from 520 to 529), Utilities
(220 to 229), and Real Estate (531) industries. We also drop the firms classified by
COMPUSTAT in the 3-digit sector 999, which turns out to be a residual category.
COMPUSTAT classifies some firms according to the 1997 NAICS system, while others
according to the 2002 NAICS system. We used the equivalence tables between the two
systems published by the BEA to assign every 2002 NAICS code to a corresponding
1997 NAICS code (for example, firms categorized by COMPUSTAT in sector 236 are
included in 233, and those in sector 423 are attributed to 421).
Next, we need to label each of the remaining sectors as either consumption or
investment good producing. Our procedure is very similar to the one described in
Appendix 2 of Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (1996). We rely on the Bureau of
Economic Analysis’ 1997 Benchmark Input-Output Use Summary Table for the US.
The Use Table tells us the fraction of output that flows from each 3-digit sector to
any of the other 3-digit industries and to final demand, respectively. We first group
final demand uses into two categories, consumption (C) and investment (I). We
do this by aggregating personal, federal, and state consumption expenditures into a
single consumption category, and similarly for investment expenditures. Since the Use
Table does not provide a breakdown of imports, exports, and changes in inventories
into consumption and investment, we choose to ignore these final demand items. Now
denote by A the square matrix of unit input-output coefficients. This matrix can be
easily constructed from the original Use Input-Output Matrix by normalizing each
row by the total commodity column. Then define the total output of the consumption
and the investment good sectors by
YC = AYC + C ⇔ YC = (I −A)
−1 C
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and
YI = AYI + I ⇔ YI = (I −A)
−1 I,
respectively. This means that we include in the output of the consumption good sector
all the intermediate good products whose ultimate destination is final consumption,
and similarly for investment. Finally, for each 3-digit industry j, we compute the share
of output destined to consumption, YC(j)/ (YC(j) + YI(j)). We assign all industries
with a share greater than or equal to 60% to the consumption good sector, and those
with a share lower than or equal to 40% to the consumption good sector. We discard
the remaining industries.
A the end of this process we are left with an unbalanced panel of 7,648 firms,
distributed in 60 sectors, for a total of 76,609 firm-year observations. For each sector,
Table 3 reports value added as a fraction of GDP as evinced from the Input-Output
Table, and the fraction of output ultimately destined to consumption. Table 4 reports
the yearly average number of firms per sector and the results of the estimation of
equations (1) and (2).
We carried out a variety of robustness checks. We repeated the analysis by deleting
all firm-year observations in which an IPO took place. As expected, the volatility
estimates decrease, but they do so across the board, leaving our results on the relative
volatility intact. Finally, we also experimented with alternative specifications of the
regression equation (1). In particular, we introduced a firm-specific time trend, in
order to control for trends in the growth process that are not captured by either age
or size. We also introduced one lead and one lag of GDP growth, in order to capture
the fact that some sectors may either lead or lag the business cycle in a systematic
way. It turns out that adding these factors adds very little to the predictive power of
the equation, therefore leaving our results unchanged.
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Table 3: Summary Statistics
NAICS Description Value Added (%) Cons. Share (%)
Investment Sectors
213 Support Activities for Mining 0.1340 12.55
233 Building, Developing, and General Contracting 3.6141 10.49
234 Heavy Construction 3.61 10.49
235 Special Trade Contractors 3.61 10.49
321 Wood Product Manufacturing 0.31 39.97
333 Machinery Manufacturing 1.21 19.50
334 Computer and Electronic Product Manufacturing 1.96 35.72
Consumption Sectors
111 Crop Production 0.79 96.75
211 Oil and Gas Extraction 0.44 85.10
212 Mining (except Oil and Gas) 0.30 63.98
311 Food Manufacturing 1.21 99.02
312 Beverage and Tobacco Product Manufacturing 0.60 99.60
313 Textile Mills 0.18 87.75
314 Textile Product Mills 0.12 80.45
315 Apparel Manufacturing 0.29 99.40
316 Leather and Allied Product Manufacturing 0.04 96.20
322 Paper Manufacturing 0.58 84.01
323 Printing and Related Support Activities 0.51 88.51
324 Petroleum and Coal Products Manufacturing 0.24 83.71
325 Chemical Manufacturing 1.65 83.15
326 Plastics and Rubber Products Manufacturing 0.73 69.10
339 Miscellaneous Manufacturing 0.57 75.65
421 Wholesale Trade, Durable Goods 5.8842 69.35
422 Wholesale Trade, Nondurable Goods 5.88 69.35
441 Motor Vehicle and Parts Dealers 5.7243 89.80
442 Furniture and Home Furnishings Stores 5.72 89.90
443 Electronics and Appliance Stores 5.72 89.80
444 Building Material and Garden Equipment 5.72 89.80
445 Food and Beverage Stores 5.72 89.80
446 Health and Personal Care Stores 5.72 89.80
448 Clothing and Clothing Accessories Stores 5.72 89.80
40Data on value added is drawn from the 1997 Use Summary Table.
41This figure refers to the aggregate of the I–O Tables’ categories “New Residential Construction”,
“New Nonresidential Construction”, and “Maintenance and Repair Construction”.
42This figure refers to the “Wholesale Trade” category. The I–O Tables do not disaggregate it
further.
43This figure refers to the “Retail Trade” category. The I–O Tables do not disaggregate it further.
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Table 3: (continued)
NAICS Description Value Added (%) Cons. Share (%)
Consumption Sectors
451 Sporting Goods, Hobby, Book, and Music Stores 5.72 89.80
452 General Merchandise Stores 5.72 89.80
453 Miscellaneous Store Retailers 5.72 89.80
454 Nonstore retailers 5.72 89.80
481 Air Transportation 0.53 85.28
482 Rail Transportation 0.28 73.99
483 Water Transportation 0.07 85.68
484 Truck Transportation 0.97 71.92
486 Pipeline Transportation 0.10 87.54
488 Support Activities for Transportation 0.2544 79.96
492 Couriers and Messengers 0.30 78.89
512 Motion Picture and Sound Recording Industries 0.31 97.44
513 Broadcasting and Telecommunications 2.38 88.68
514 Information and Data Processing Services 0.36 81.83
532 Rental and Leasing Services 0.67 83.65
533 Owners and Lessors of Nonfinancial Assets 1.18 79.14
541 Professional, Scientific and Technical Services 6.20 67.91
561 Administrative and Support Services 2.69 80.80
562 Waste Management and Remediation Services 0.27 83.88
611 Educational Services 0.75 98.12
621 Ambulatory Health Care Services 3.15 99.98
622 Hospitals 1.82 100.00
623 Nursing and Residential Care Facilities 0.69 100.00
711 Performing Arts, Spectator Sports, ... 0.36 93.26
713 Amusement, Gambling, and Recreation Industries 0.54 98.62
721 Accommodation 0.92 92.45
722 Food Services and Drinking Places 1.79 96.96
811 Repair and Maintenance 0.95 85.06
812 Personal and Laundry Services 0.67 98.73
44This figure refers to the I–O Tables’ category “Sightseeing Transportation and Transportation
Support”.
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Table 4: Estimates
NAICS ∆ ln(GDP ) ln(size) ln(age) volatility (ranking) avg # firms
Investment Sectors
213 -2.58474∗∗∗ -.031935 -.0279882 .14522639 (6) 11
233 4.889902∗∗∗ .0146695 -.0120593 .16932216 (3) 14
234 -1.11631 .064643∗∗ -.1078394 .15559047 (4) 6
235 1.349161 -.017773 .0057085 .10393975 (14) 7
321 3.570814∗∗∗ -.0764269∗∗∗ -.0128182 .09623954 (16) 16
333 1.936239∗∗∗ -.0222567∗∗∗ -.0629759∗∗∗ .08959053 (22) 100
334 1.87173∗∗∗ -.0819238∗∗∗ -.1380663∗∗∗ .11995031 (10) 247
Consumption Sectors
111 .2276193 -.2198836∗∗∗ .0182616 .09521981 (17) 4
211 -1.506704∗∗∗ .0009687 -.148713∗∗∗ .17975309 (2) 63
212 1.298455 .066703∗∗ -.0804207∗∗ .12392078 (9) 23
311 .2899721 -.0300952∗∗∗ -.0098447 .04813446 (50) 45
312 .2945817 -.0139544 .0035176 .04827698 (49) 13
313 1.883935∗∗∗ .0018545 -.0381483∗∗∗ .06382465 (39) 15
314 1.541484∗∗∗ -.0112328 -.0233189 .06102157 (40) 5
315 1.493316∗∗∗ -.0840052∗∗∗ -.0572991∗∗∗ .06526784 (37) 25
316 .9126362∗∗ -.0793432∗∗∗ -.0971568∗∗∗ .06697022 (32) 11
322 1.520007∗∗∗ -.0392657∗∗∗ -.005745 .04357254 (55) 27
323 .6994879∗∗∗ .0195839 -.0619097∗∗∗ .05022572 (47) 14
324 .314319 -.0167882 -.0155253 .06582374 (35) 75
325 .9638073∗∗ -.0493668∗∗∗ -.0287423 .1068661 (12) 133
326 2.05841∗∗∗ -.003499 -.0314198∗∗ .0594798 (41) 31
339 1.381061∗∗∗ -.0266606∗∗ -.160932∗∗∗ .09472307 (19) 53
421 2.336689∗∗∗ -.011083 -.0951131∗∗∗ .07806022 (28) 52
422 .698516∗ -.0581421∗∗∗ -.0018955 .06675319 (33) 30
441 -.1391965 .0266961 -.2257383∗∗∗ .04681344 (52) 4
442 2.271582∗∗∗ -.0884101∗∗∗ -.0681718 .05181056 (45) 5
443 1.096394 -.0061012 -.1036968∗∗∗ .07889179 (26) 7
444 1.628715∗∗∗ -.0454901∗∗∗ -.0290038∗ .05165222 (46) 8
445 .3863699∗∗∗ -.0224592∗∗∗ -.0294501∗∗ .03008296 (60) 22
446 .2876406 -.0844839∗∗∗ .0465743∗∗∗ .03667084 (59) 9
448 1.458187∗∗∗ -.0576939∗∗∗ -.0430211∗∗∗ .04439133 (53) 22
451 1.411753∗∗∗ -.0387656∗ -.1167061∗∗∗ .04809613 (51) 10
452 .9091112∗∗∗ -.0341905∗∗∗ -.0032879 .03908058 (58) 16
453 .7728052 -.081209∗∗∗ -.1278498∗ .06602433 (34) 6
454 2.260688 .0862907∗∗ -.2635337∗∗∗ .10540139 (13) 11
481 1.371468∗∗∗ -.095155∗∗∗ .0290142∗ .05601279 (43) 21
∗∗∗Significant at 1%; ∗∗Significant at 5%; ∗Significant at 10%.
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Table 4: (continued)
NAICS ∆ ln(GDP ) ln(size) ln(age) volatility (ranking) avg # firms
Consumption Sectors
482 1.3467∗∗∗ -.0628133∗∗∗ -.0566189∗∗∗ .04071609 (57) 12
483 .7371019 -.0201522 -.1366335∗∗∗ .08252276 (24) 8
484 2.010462∗∗∗ -.018186∗∗∗ -.0578873∗∗∗ .04161309 (56) 14
486 -.9153473 -.0298649 -.1017416∗∗ .07144465 (30) 7
488 .2888619 -.0441243∗ -.0436785 .06786653 (31) 5
492 1.992152∗∗∗ -.0528086∗∗∗ .0185856 .04376236 (54) 4
512 2.455533∗∗ -.0132788 -.068447 .12824485 (8) 13
513 .8861651∗∗∗ -.0961381∗∗∗ -.0453309∗∗∗ .05362354 (44) 60
514 2.922503 -.0286456 -.4517239∗∗∗ .15439035 (5) 15
532 1.898361∗∗∗ -.0645807∗∗∗ -.0715701∗∗ .08146203 (25) 11
533 4.509923∗∗∗ .0458047 -.1108756 .19694376 (1) 12
541 1.693518∗∗∗ -.0280361∗∗ -.1656993∗∗∗ .11384834 (11) 73
561 1.147367∗∗ -.0488138∗∗∗ -.1318562∗∗∗ .08727907 (23) 24
562 3.029032 .0771851 -.2421802∗ .13330466 (7) 11
611 1.561419 .0085908 -.308144∗∗∗ .09347452 (21) 7
621 1.57983 -.0909398∗∗∗ -.1334319∗ .10331041 (15) 19
622 -.0837145 .0440112 -.4765116∗∗∗ .07771492 (29) 5
623 1.488231∗∗ -.0834257∗∗∗ .0391971 .04855599 (48) 6
711 .650971 -.0181283 -.0249553 .06541755 (36) 12
713 -.3059015 -.0105072 -.1721512∗∗ .09400301 (20) 10
721 1.004406 -.0180331 -.064565∗ .07821761 (27) 17
722 1.760342∗∗∗ -.0421361∗∗∗ -.1725204∗∗∗ .0646428 (38) 32
811 .9618112 -.2429684∗∗∗ -.2399713 .09486315 (18) 5
812 1.729205 .047491 -.2180747∗∗∗ .0589075 (42) 8
∗∗∗Significant at 1%; ∗∗Significant at 5%; ∗Significant at 10%.
B Proofs
Lemma 1 Let g¯ ≡ ρgh+(1−ρ)gl. Then g¯
′ ≡ dg¯dξ = −αρ(1−ρ)∆
ω−ξ∆u′hu
′
l
ρRl+(1−ρ)Rh
[ρu′h+(1−ρ)u′l]
2
1+αρ(1−ρ)ξ∆u′
h
u′
l
Rl−Rh
[ρu′h+(1−ρ)u′l]
2
>
0, where u′i = u
′(gi), u
′′
i = u
′′(gi), and Ri = −
u′′i
u′i
, i = h, l.
Proof. By definition of gh, gl, and ω, it is easy to establish that g¯ = (1− α)z¯I −
αρ(1− ρ)ξ∆ω. Then, by the implicit function theorem, it follows that g¯′ = −αρ(1−
ρ)∆
ω+ξ ∂ω
∂ξ
1+αρ(1−ρ)ξ∆ ∂ω
∂g¯
. Differentiating ω with respect to ξ yields ∂ω∂ξ = −∆u
′
hu
′
l
ρRl+(1−ρ)Rh
[ρu′h+(1−ρ)u
′
l]
2 <
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0. Proceeding again by differentiation, we obtain ∂ω∂g¯ = u
′
hu
′
l
Rl−Rh
[ρu′h+(1−ρ)u
′
l]
2 . Since
CRRA preferences display non-increasing absolute risk aversion, it follows that ∂ω∂g¯ >
0.
Proposition 2
Proof. Using gh = g¯+(1−ρ)ξ∆ and gl = g¯−ρξ∆, we obtain
dω
dξ = u
′
lu
′
h
g¯′(Rl−Rh)−∆(ρRl+(1−ρ)Rh)
[ρu′h+(1−ρ)u
′
l]
2 .
Using the expression for g¯′ recovered in Lemma 1, we show that g¯′(Rl−Rh)−∆(ρRl+
(1− ρ)Rh < 0. This completes the proof.
Lemma 2 ddξ
[
ρu
(
gh
z¯I+ρ(1−ρ)ξ∆ω
)
+ (1− ρ)u
(
gl
z¯I+ρ(1−ρ)ξ∆ω
)]
> 0.
Proof. Using gh = (1 − α)z¯I − αρ(1 − ρξ∆ω + (1 − ρ)ξ∆) and gl = (1 − α)z¯I −
αρ(1− ρξ∆ω − ρξ∆), we obtain
[z¯I + ρ(1− ρ)ξ∆ω]
2 d
dξ
[
ρu
(
gh
z¯I + ρ(1− ρ)ξ∆ω
)
+ (1− ρ)u
(
gl
z¯I + ρ(1− ρ)ξ∆ω
)]
=
=
ρ(1− ρ)z¯I∆
[z¯I + ρ(1− ρ)ξ∆ω]−σ
(u′h − u
′
l)−
ρ(1− ρ)z¯I∆ω
[z¯I + ρ(1− ρ)ξ∆ω]−σ
[ρu′h + (1− ρu
′
l)]
−
ρ(1− ρ)∆ξ
[z¯I + ρ(1− ρ)ξ∆ω]−σ
dω
dξ
[
ρ (z¯I + (1− ρ)ξ∆) u
′
h + (1− ρ) (z¯I − ρξ∆)u
′
l
]
.
Then, the observation that ω[ρu′h + (1− ρ)u
′
l] = [u
′
h − u
′
l] leads to
[z¯I + ρ(1− ρ)ξ∆ω]
2 d
dξ
[
ρu
(
gh
z¯I + ρ (1− ρ) ξ∆ω
)
+ (1− ρ)u
(
gl
z¯I + ρ (1− ρ) ξ∆ω
)]
=
= −ρ(1− ρ)∆ξ
dω
dξ
[z¯I + ρ(1− ρ)ξ∆ω][ρ(z¯I + (1− ρ)ξ∆)u
′
h + (1− ρ)(z¯I − ρξ∆)u
′
l].
Since dωdξ < 0 by Proposition 2 and z¯I − ρξ∆ = ρzh(1− ξ) + (1− ρ)zl + ρξzl > 0, the
above expression is positive.
Proposition 3
Proof. Solving (23) for p and substituting in (24), we obtain
Q =
(1− σ)
1
1−σ
1− α
[
ρu
(
gh
z¯I + ρ (1− ρ) ξ∆ω
)
+ (1− ρ)u
(
gl
z¯I + ρ (1− ρ) ξ∆ω
)] 1
1−σ
In light of Lemma 2, differentiation of the above expression immediately yields dQdξ > 0.
Let’s now turn to dpdξ . Taking logarithms of (23) and (24) leads to
log p = C − α log [z¯I + ρ (1− ρ) ξ∆ω]−
1− α
1− σ
log [ρuh + (1− ρ) ul] ,
where C = log zC + (1 − α) log(1 − α) −
1−α
1−σ log(1 − σ) is a constant term. Using
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gh = g¯ + (1− ρξ∆), gl = g¯ − ρξ∆, and g¯
′ = −αρ (1− ρ)∆
ω+ξ ∂ω
∂ξ
1+αρ(1−ρ)ξ∆ ∂ω
∂g¯
, we obtain
d log p
dξ
= −αρ (1− ρ)∆
ω + ξ dωdξ
z¯I + ρ (1− ρ) ξ∆ω
−
1− α
1− σ
ρ (1− ρ)∆ [u′h − u
′
l]
ρuh + (1− ρ) ul
+
+
1− α
1− σ
αρ (1− ρ)∆
[
ω + ξ dωdξ
]
[ρu′h + (1− ρ) u
′
l]
ρuh + (1− ρ)ul
1
1 + αρ(1− ρ)ξ∆∂ω∂g¯
.
By Proposition 2, dωdξ < 0. Therefore, ω + ξ
dω
dξ < 0. Furthermore, in proving Lemma
1 we established that ∂ω∂g¯ > 0. These two conditions imply that
1− α
1− σ
αρ (1− ρ)∆
[
ω + ξ dωdξ
]
[ρu′h + (1− ρ)u
′
l]
ρuh + (1− ρ) ul
1
1 + αρ(1 − ρ)ξ∆∂ω∂g¯
< 0
and 1 + αρ(1 − ρ)ξ∆∂ω∂g¯ > 1. Therefore we can conclude that
d log p
dξ
> −αρ (1− ρ)∆
ω + ξ dωdξ
z¯I + ρ (1− ρ) ξ∆ω
−
1− α
1− σ
ρ (1− ρ)∆ [u′h − u
′
l]
ρuh + (1− ρ)ul
+
1− α
1− σ
αρ (1− ρ)∆
[
ω + ξ dωdξ
]
[ρu′h + (1− ρ)u
′
l]
ρuh + (1− ρ) ul
.
Our strategy will be to prove that the expression on the right-hand side is positive.
With some work, such expression can be rewritten as
− αρ(1− ρ)∆
[
ω + ξ
dω
dξ
]
(1− σ)[ρuh + (1− ρ)ul]− (1− α) [ρu
′
h + (1− ρ)u
′
l] [z¯I + ρ(1− ρ)ξ∆ω]
(1− σ) [z¯I + ρ(1− ρ)ξ∆ω] [ρuh + (1− ρ)ul]
−
1− α
1− σ
ρ(1− ρ)∆ω
ρu′h + (1− ρ)u
′
l
ρuh + (1− ρ)ul
.
Since the last term is positive, a sufficient condition for p to be increasing in ξ is that
Γ ≡ (1− σ)[ρuh + (1− ρ)ul]− (1− α)
[
ρu′h + (1− ρ) u
′
l
]
[z¯I + ρ (1− ρ) ξ∆ω] ≥ 0.
Using u(c) = c1−σu
′(c) and g¯ = (1−α)z¯I −αρ(1− ρ)ξ∆ω, we conclude that Γ = 0.
C Ex-ante Heterogeneity
In this section we extend the baseline model introduced in Section 3 to account for ex-
ante heterogeneity in entrepreneurs’ abilities. This will introduce a new adjustment
margin, as the cross-sectoral allocation of ability will now be a function of investor
protection. This may relevant, as one may argue that this kind of selection effect is
an important way in which investor protection affects economic development.
We assume that individuals differ with respect to their ability to succeed in the
investment good sector. The probability of success is still the same for everyone.
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Agents differ in the payoffs, however. When successful, they obtain a payoff x. When
unsuccessful, they obtain x+∆. For simplicity, we consider only two types of agents.
A fraction ψ has a productivity parameter xg. The remainder has xb, with xg > xb.
All the other assumptions are the same as in Section 3. In particular, all agents have
the same productivity when employed in the consumption good sector. Obviously,
average productivity in the investment good sector is now type-dependent. We denote
it as z¯I(x) = x+ ρ∆.
Consistently with our analysis in Section 4, we require that along the equilibrium
path all agents weakly prefer their occupational choices. Depending upon parameter
values, at every time either one or one of the agents’ types may be indifferent between
the occupational choices. In what follows we restrict our attention to parameters that
yield equilibria in which the relatively unproductive agents are indifferent between
producing either good at all times, while relatively productive agents always strictly
prefer the investment good sector.
Definition 2 Given an initial aggregate capital stock K0 > 0, a competitive equi-
librium with unproductive agents always indifferent between occupations is a non-
negative consumption level of the initial old co0, non-negative contingent consumption
allocations for young and old individuals in the investment good sector, {cyht(x), c
y
lt(x)}
∞
t=0
and {coht(x), c
o
lt(x)}
∞
t=1, non-negative consumption allocations for young and old indi-
viduals in the consumption good sector {cyt }
∞
t=0 and {c
o
t}
∞
t=1, sequences of contracts
{kIt(x), τht(x), τlt(x)}
∞
t=0 and {kCt, τCt}
∞
t=0, a fraction of unproductive individuals pro-
ducing investment goods {Nt}
∞
t=0, relative prices {pt}
∞
t=0, and interest rates {rt}
∞
t=0,
such that
1. co0 = p0K0(1 + r0) and at all t ≥ 0:
2. for the entrepreneurs in the investment good sector and for i = h, l and t ≥ 0,
cyit(x) = τit(x)− s(τit(x), rt+1) and c
o
it+1(x) = s(τit(x), rt+1)(1 + rt+1);
3. for the entrepreneurs in the consumption good sector cyt = τCt− s(τCt, rt+1) and
cot = s(τCt, rt+1)(1 + rt+1);
4. the scale in the consumption good sector is efficient, i.e. it solves problem (P1);
5. lending contracts are optimal, i.e. for all t ≥ 0, they solve problem (P2);
6. Nt ∈ [0, 1];
7. unproductive young individuals are indifferent between the two sectors:
v(τCt, rt+1) = ρv(τht(xb), rt+1) + (1− ρ)v(τlt(xb), rt+1); (29)
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8. productive young individuals are better off producing investment goods:
ρv(τht(xg), rt+1) + (1− ρ)v(τlt(xg), rt+1) ≥ v(τCt, rt+1); (30)
9. aggregate savings are equal to the value of the capital stock:
ptKt+1 = ψ [ρs(τht(xg), rt+1) + (1− ρ)s (τlt(xg), rt+1)]
+ (1− ψ)Nt [ρs (τht(xb), rt+1) + (1− ρ) s (τlt(xb), rt+1)]
+ (1− ψ)(1 −Nt)s (τCt, rt+1) ; (31)
10. gross investment equals the production of investment goods:
Kt+1 = (1− δ)Kt + ψz¯I(xg)k
α
It(xg) + (1− ψ)Ntz¯I(xb)k
α
It(xb); (32)
11. the market for capital clears:
Kt = ψkIt(xg) + (1− ψ)NtkIt(xb) + (1− ψ)(1 −Nt)kCt. (33)
The relative price of capital pt and the relative size Qt(xb) ≡ kCt/kIt(xb) are
constant over time and are the solution to the system of non-linear equations
p =
zC
z¯I(xb) + ρ(1− ρ)ξ∆ω(xb)
Q(xb)
α−1, (FOC(xb))
and
p =
(1− α)zC
[ρgh(xb)1−σ + (1− ρ)gl(xb)1−σ]1/(1−σ)
Q(xb)
α. (IND)
The constants gh(xb), gl(xb), and ω(xb) are determined as in the proof of Proposition
1. It also follows that the comparative statics of p and Q(xb) are unchanged. In
particular, both p and Q(xb) increase with ξ. Finally, the relative size Qt(xg) is also
constant over time and is determined by
p =
zC
z¯I(xg) + ρ(1− ρ)ξ∆ω(xg)
Q(xg)
α−1. (FOC(xg))
The relative average size is then given by
Q¯t ≡
[ψ + (1− ψ)Nt]kCt
ψkIt(xg) + (1− ψ)NtkIt(xb)
=
ψ + (1− ψ)Nt
ψ/Q(xg) + (1− ψ)Nt/Q(xb)
. (34)
Analytical results are not easily forthcoming. However, numerical results show
that the qualitative effect of poorer protection on the relative price and on the in-
vestment rate are the same as those described in Section 6. Whether Q¯t increases
as investor protection deteriorates, depends on the response of Q(xg) to changes in
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Figure 9: Comparative statics with respect to ξ.
ξ. Numerical analysis shows that for certain parameter values Q(xg) does indeed
decrease with ξ, and so does Q¯t.
Further analysis reveals that the impact of poor protection on Q¯t depends on risk-
aversion. Figure 9 gives a qualitative rendering of the schedules FOC(xb), FOC(xg),
and IND, with high (ξ = 0) and low protection (ξ = 1), respectively. In Section
4.2 we justified the shape and direction of change of the schedules. For the sake of
completeness, here we add that the FOC(xb) schedule lies everywhere lower than
FOC(xb) because both z¯I(xg) > z¯I(xg) and 0 > ω(xg) > ω(xb). The term ω is in-
creasing in x because of non-increasing absolute risk-aversion: a given spread between
contingent transfers induces a smaller utility cost when the average transfer is higher.
Let’s now get to the effect of risk-aversion on the comparative statics of Q¯t. Since
our preferences display nonincreasing risk-aversion, an increase in ξ has a higher
impact on the factor ω(xb) than on ω(xg). As a consequence, the upward shift in
FOC(xb) is always greater. How greater, depends on the coefficient of relative risk
aversion. A higher value of σ, by increasing the gap between the absolute risk-aversion
coefficients of the two types, also implies a larger gap between the schedules FOC1(xb)
and FOC1(xg). In turn, this means a higher chance that Q1(xh) < Q0(xh).
D The model with a continuum of states
In this appendix we analyze in detail the model with a continuum of states introduced
in Section 5. We start by considering the case of no exogenous growth (i.e., γ = 1).
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We assume that, in both sectors, z ∈ Z ≡ (zmin,+∞), zmin ≥ 0. In sector j, j = I, C,
z is distributed according to the cumulative distribution function Fj(z), which admits
density function fj(z) and first moment z¯j .
The contracting problem in the investment good sector writes as follows (the
problem in the consumption good sector is entirely analogous):
max
kIt,τIt(z)
∫
Z
u[τIt(z)]fI(z)dz,
subject to u[τIt(z)] ≥ u[τIt(z
′) + ξpt(z − z
′)kαIt] ∀ z, z
′, z ≥ z′, (35)
τ¯It ≡
∫
Z
τIt(z)fI(z)dz = ptz¯Ik
α
It − (rt + δ) ptkIt. (36)
By monotonicity and strict concavity of the utility function, the incentive compati-
bility constraint (35) implies τIt(z) = τIt(z
′) + ξpt(z − z
′)kαIt ∀ z, z
′, z ≥ z′. Then,
simply by the definition of τ¯It, it follows that ∀ z, τIt(z) = τ¯It+ξpt(z− z¯I)k
α
It. Finally,
this implies that the above program collapses to
max
kIt,τ¯It
∫
Z
u[τ¯It + ξpt(z − z¯I)k
α
It]fI(z)dz,
subject to τ¯It = pt[z¯Ik
α
It − (rt + δ) kIt].
The necessary and sufficient condition for this problem is the generalization of condi-
tion (19):
rt + δ = αk
α−1
It
[
z¯I + ξ
∫
Z
u′[τIt(z)](z − z¯I)fI(z)dz∫
Z
u′[τIt(z)]fI(z)dz
]
.
We can follow the argument of Proposition 1 to show that, subject to a restriction
on the value of zmin, the transfer function takes the form τIt(z) = gI(z)ptk
α
It, where
gI : Z→ <
+ is the solution to the following functional equation:
gI(z) = z¯I(1− α− ξ)− αξ
∫
Z
u′[gI(z)](z − z¯I)fI(z)dz∫
Z
u′[gI(z)]fI(z)dz
+ ξz. (37)
Now let x denote a random variable distributed over (0,+∞) with distribution FI(z−
zmin). Then we can show that necessary and sufficient condition for equation (37)
to admit a solution is that ξ ≤ z¯I+zmin
z¯I+
α
1−α
E(x1−σ)
E(x−σ)
, provided that the two expectations
exist. In turn, this implies that a solution to (37) exists for all ξ ∈ [0, 1], if and only
if zmin ≥
α
1−α
E(x1−σ)
E(x−σ) . In Section 5 we have assumed that log(z − zmin) is normally
distributed with mean µI and variance η
2
I . In that case, the condition rewrites as
zmin ≥
α
1−αe
µI+
1
2
η2I (1−2σ).
Then, under the condition that zmin ≥
α
1−αe
max[µC+
1
2
η2C(1−2σ),µI+
1
2
η2I (1−2σ)], solv-
ing for the competitive equilibrium is rather simple. Let ω˜j ≡ Z
u′[gj(z)](z−z¯j)fj(z)dz

Z
u′[gj(z)]fj(z)dz
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for j = I, C. As it was the case for the simpler version of the model introduced in
Section 3, Qt and pt turn out to be time-invariant. They can be expressed as
Q =
z¯C + ξω˜C
z¯I + ξω˜I
[
E[u(gI(z))]
E[u(gC(z))]
] 1
1−σ
and p =
[
z¯C + ξω˜C
z¯I + ξω˜I
]α [E[u(gC (z))]
E[u(gI(z))]
] 1−α
1−σ
.
For given K0, the competitive equilibrium allocation is characterized by imposing
that the capital stock (expressed in units of consumption good) at t + 1 is equal to
saving at time t:
pKt+1 = κ(rt+1)k
α
It [pNtE(gI(z)) + (1−Nt)Q
αE(gC (z))] , (38)
the capital stock at t+1 is equal to the capital at time t plus net investment at time
t:
Kt+1 = (1− δ)Kt +Ntz¯Ik
α
t , (39)
the capital stock at time t is equal to the sum of the capital utilized in the two sectors:
Kt = NtkIt + (1−Nt)kCt, (40)
and that the necessary and sufficient condition for the contracting problem in the
capital good sector is satisfied:
rt + δ = αk
α−1
It [z¯I + ξω˜I ] . (41)
It is now straightforward to amend this model to allow for exogenous growth.
We simply assume that in sector j, log(z − γtzmin) ∼ N(µj , η
2
j ). This economy
converges to a balanced-growth steady-state where the interest rate rt, the fraction of
entrepreneurs in the investment good sector Nt, the relative price pt, and Qt are all
constant, while the remaining variables grow at the constant rate γ
1
1−α . In particular,
the equilibrium values of p and Q do not depend on the growth rate of the economy.
Transfers in sector C at time t are given by τCt(z) = gCt(z)k
α
Ct = γ
tgC0(z)k
α
Ct.
Similarly for sector I.
Now define K̂t = γ
− 1
1−α
tKt. Then, for given initial capital stock K0, the com-
petitive equilibrium paths of K̂t, k̂It, k̂Ct, Nt, and rt are characterized by simple
transformations of equations (38)–(41):
pK̂t+1γ
1
1−α = κ(rt+1)k̂
α
It [pNtE(gI0(z)) + (1−Nt)Q
αE(gC0(z))] ,
K̂t+1γ
1
1−α = (1− δ)K̂t +Ntz¯I k̂
α
t ,
K̂t = Ntk̂It + (1−Nt)k̂Ct,
rt + δ = αk̂
α−1
It [z¯I + ξω˜I ].
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